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1 Introduction
In a representative democracy, a government is usually elected by a coalition of groups who
expect it to press for their interests. This provides the government with the incentive to
demonstrate its congruence with those interests. Indeed, observation suggests that public
officials and their staffs spend substantial time, energy, and resources figuring out how to
appear sympathetic to the concerns of interest groups, a behavior rarely accounted for by
existing theories.
This paper develops a framework for studying pork-barrel spending that signals a
government’s concern for, or a shared identity with, its constituents. We suppose that
the electorate is uncertain about a public official’s preferences over interest groups. A
voter – at least one whose vote is motivated by his private interests – would like to
re-elect the official if she has appeared to put sufficient weight on his concerns. Such
retrospective voting1 provides the official with an incentive to direct benefits to him (i.e.,
to conduct pork-barrel spending). In essence, she would like to tell the voter: “I care
about you.”
We show that this incentive tends to generate too much public spending (or equiva-
lently an excessive deficit if taxes are kept constant), but that there are three qualifications
to this result. First, the very inefficiency of pork – the fact that the electorate overall
typically loses more from it than the targeted interest groups gain – places some re-
straint on the official. Second, if the official’s overall spending propensity is unknown and
at least a portion of public spending must appear on the public balance sheet, a high
spending level will be perceived as a bad signal by the electorate. Thus, the official will
be torn between her desire to please interest groups and her awareness that too much
spending can backfire. We characterize the conditions under which public disclosure of
fiscal deficits can actually lead to low public spending. Third, limits on fiscal deficits are
sometimes legally imposed, as with the Stability and Growth Pact in Europe or balanced
budget requirements in U.S. states. Even so, we show that they can have unfortunate
side effects because of “crowding out” and “time shifting.” Specifically, deficit caps induce
the official to cut down not only on pork but also on useful public spending. Such caps
further introduce a bias toward high-cost projects that frontload benefits and backload
expenditure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section 3
assumes that the public official’s spending propensity is known; there is uncertainty
about her preferences (namely, which interest groups she prefers), but not about the
total spending she would like to do. This section shows how, in the absence of a budget
cap, pork-barrel politics lead to overspending. The contribution of Sections 2 and 3 lies
in the construction and analysis of a simple but unusual model of signaling through pork
spending. We believe that our equilibrium existence, uniqueness and characterized re-
1Retrospective voting plays a central role in Ferejohn’s (1986) classic article. In our paper, retrospec-
tive voting is rationally derived from the voter’s updating about the official’s preferences.
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sults are of theoretical interest. The main contribution to political economy is the (simple
but important) finding that accountable officials –by which me mean “officials subject to
reelection”– distribute more pork than non-accountable ones, as well as to establish that
key insights from the literature (such as the determinants of interest groups’ ability to
attract pork) carry over to our model.
The richer insights for political economy can be found in Sections 4 and 5. Section 4
considers the impact of a constitutional limit on budget deficits. A spending cap induces
two types of distortions: it encourages the official to move expenditures off balance sheet,
at a potential cost for public finances; and it crowds out useful public spending, not only
pork. We provide an explanation for why elected officials are in practice granted larger
discretionary budgets than non-elected ones. The idea is that elected officials, having
higher career concerns, are more tempted to spend on pork and so imposing a tight
budget would generate high levels of off-balance-sheet activities and low levels of useful
public spending.
Section 5 introduces uncertainty about the official’s desired spending level, and ex-
amines how the degree of budget transparency affects overall spending. Policy is opaque
when an interest group observes only the pork it receives itself; it is transparent when
the group also observes total spending. Opaque policymaking yields the same pandering
outcome as under symmetric information about the official’s spending propensity, except
that for very costly pork there exists a second, “Groucho Marx” equilibrium in which the
official spends only on her favorite interest groups and is reelected by non-beneficiaries, as
not receiving pork is a good signal that the official’s spending propensity is low. Trans-
parency potentially allows the official to signal her thriftiness and can lead to greater
restraint on spending. Section 6 offers a brief summary and a few ideas for further work.
Proofs omitted in the text can be found in the Appendix.
Relationship to the literature
Although we believe our model offers a new perspective on pork-barrel politics, it is, of
course, related to various strands of the existing literature. Our excessive-spending results
are connected to the broader literature on deficit bias.2 Much of that literature assumes
that interest groups impose an externality on other parties; that is, their spending is
partially financed by these other entities. Sometimes these other parties are future voters
or governments (Persson and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Aghion and
Bolton, 1990);3 sometimes they are other subgovernments under fiscal federalism (as in
2A review of this literature and an assessment of its relevance can be found in Calmfors (2005).
3 Martimort (2001) revisits the Persson-Svensson-Alesina-Tabellini model (Persson and Svensson,
1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) of the commitment value of budget deficits from the standpoint of re-
distribution (Mirrlees, 1971). He supposes that governments are inequality averse (left-wing governments
more so than right-wing ones). He shows how a left-wing government is both hurt by a budget deficit
(the future marginal utility of income increases) and helped by it (a right-wing government tomorrow will
be constrained to adopt a more redistributive policy). One historical cause of deficit bias, dynamically
inconsistent monetary policy, has become less important in recent years with the growth of independent
central banks, which by and large have refrained from using inflation surprises to finance fiscal deficits.
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Argentina or Brazil); and sometimes they are current interest groups (Velasco, 2000;
Battaglini and Coate, 2007a,b). In the Battaglini-Coate models, the legislature chooses
spending on public goods as well as on district-targeted pork. The models show that
forcing the legislature to balance its budget (or, more generally, constraining its ability
to smooth shocks by issuing debt) increases welfare when the country’s tax base is large
(relative to public spending needs), but not when it is small4.
In the literature on “Ramsey electoral promises,” campaigning politicians make bind-
ing promises to various interest groups subject to an overall budget constraint (Dixit and
Londregan, 1996, 1998; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Myerson, 1993) or, more generally,
subject to the requirement that debt be issued to finance a budget deficit (Lizzeri , 1999).
These theories, too, involve an externality, except that it is mediated by a government
courting interest groups, rather than by interest groups themselves. In Lizzeri and Per-
sico (2005), “bad” (pork-barrel) public spending is assumed to be more targetable than
“good” (public good) public spending. That paper shows that the set of parameters for
which pork-barrel spending occurs in equilibrium grows with the number of candidates.
The central contribution of our approach is to add asymmetric information to these
literatures: The official signals to the electorate at large as well as to individual interest
groups. Specifically, in contrast with earlier work, we emphasize the pandering component
of pork-barrel spending, as well as the effects of deficit transparency and opaqueness. In
the Ramsey literature, the beneficiaries of pork are those whose vote is pivotal to getting
an official elected. Our work is instead aimed at the complementary phenomenon of
pandering by politicians who are already in office and are targeting groups that may have
contributed little to their electoral campaign.
The literature on common agency (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Dixit, 1996) em-
phasizes the role of bribes/campaign contributions in determining policy.5 In this line of
work, groups commit to making policy-contingent payments to a politician. The success
of an interest group in attracting pork then corresponds not to its role in elections, but to
its ability to bribe politicians. This literature is therefore quite different from our paper.
In an important and closely related contribution, Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009) study
an election model in which two candidates credibly promise transfers to n distinct ex-
ante identical interest groups, which then vote stochastically as a function of the utility
differential promised by the candidates. These transfers are financed through distortionary
taxation on labor. Deficits can be financed by borrowing abroad. Under transparency,
no transfers are promised. But if groups observe their own transfer perfectly and the
transfers to other groups only in a noisy way, budget deficits emerge. Furthermore, the
impact of transparency of transfers differs from that of transparency of revenue.
4Drazen and Ilzetzki (2013) emphasize a different cost of attempts to constrain the distribution of
pork. In their model, the agenda setter has private information about the value of a public good; pork
acts as a signalling device and greases the legislative wheels.
5In Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002, 2006), interest groups can influence policy both by offering
contributions and by providing information favorable to the group. The focus is on determinants of the
form of influence, and on whether competition generates more decision-making-relevant information.
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Gavazza and Lizzeri’s focus on electoral promises and ours on policy while in office are
complementary; electoral promises probably are most relevant for year 1 in office and on a
stand-alone basis would predict decreasing expenditures over the political tenure while our
model predicts higher expenditures prior to an election.6 Besides this complementarity,
the main distinctions between the two papers are two-fold: First, our model is one of
signaling (to each group and to the electorate as a whole). Second, we study the impact
of tenure/accountability, while the Gavazza-Lizzeri model takes the politician’s stake and
therefore career concerns as exogenous.
The strand of literature most closely related to our paper assumes that an official acts
so as to signal her congruence with the electorate (Maskin and Tirole, 2004) or her ability
to implement public projects (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007, 2008; Canes-Wrone, Herron
and Shotts, 2001; Dewatripont et al, 1999; Dewatripont and Seabright, 2006; Rogoff, 1990;
Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). The key difference between our work and this previous literature
is that now public spending is strategically targeted to heterogeneous constituencies (a
feature borrowed from the Ramsey literature).7
Drazen and Eslava (Drazen and Eslava, 2006, 2010, 2013) develop models of spending
as a mechanism to signal politicians’ unobserved preferences. Those papers and this
one concentrate on sufficiently different applications as to make them complementary.
They share the idea that rational voters support an incumbent who targets them before
the election even though they know this targeting is electorally motivated. Drazen and
Eslava (2013), for example, considers non-monotonicities in electoral effects of targeting
as well as implications for cycles in the composition of spending, as in Drazen and Eslava
(2013). However, there are some important modeling differences. The Drazen and Eslava
papers, unlike ours, consider a known, fixed budget with no deficit. Consequently, being
targeted cannot lead to negative inferences, and overall fiscal conservatism cannot arise,
unlike in Section 5 of our paper. Furthermore, our model includes the possibility of off-
balance-sheet spending. Finally, our paper provides a comparison between accountable
and non-accountable officials, both in their spending behavior and in the fiscal constraints
they are likely to face.
Lastly, we should mention that there is a large literature in which the officials try
to signal their ability rather than their preferences among interest groups (Rogoff, 1990;
Prat, 2002; Coate, 2004). However, that literature does not touch on pork barrel spending,
the topic of this paper.
6Brender and Drazen (2013) find that new democracies increase their expenditures during election
years, while established democracies are more prone to punish profligates (but nonetheless witness large
expenditure composition change during election year).
7See Panova (2009) for a model in which politicians signal their preferences among constituents twice:
during the campaign, and while in office.
5
2 The Model
There are two dates t = 1, 2. A “public official” or “incumbent” chooses a policy at date
1, and then voters decide simultaneously whether or not to vote for her re-election. If a
majority vote in her favor,8 the official chooses another policy at date 2. If not re-elected,
she is replaced by another official, who chooses the date-2 policy.
The electorate consists of a set of “minorities” or “interest groups”. For simplicity, we
will assume a continuum of interest groups uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The official’s
date-1 policy is a choice, for each interest group j ∈ [0, 1], of a spending level yˆj ∈ {0, 1}.
That is, we assume, for now, that pork is indivisible (we consider divisible pork in Section
3). Spending level yˆj = 1 yields benefit B to interest group j and costs L > B to the
electorate as a whole. Spending level yˆj = 0 yields no benefit and costs nothing. Thus, in
this simplest version of the model, public spending is pure pork – i.e., socially wasteful.
(We will later generalize the analysis to accommodate useful spending as well.) The net
welfare of interest group j at date 1 is therefore
yˆjB − yL , where y =
∫ 1
0
yˆkdk.
The date-2 policy (chosen either by the incumbent or her replacement) is completely
analogous to the one at date 1.
Throughout this paper we consider two alternative assumptions about which aspects
of a policy interest groups can observe. In the opaque case, we suppose that interest group
j observes only the pork yˆj it receives itself. In the transparent case, j observes yˆj and
also total spending y.
Key to our modeling is the idea that the official is more interested in some interest
groups than in others, either because of her intrinsic preferences or because she has dif-
ferent stakes in the welfare of different groups. We formalize this by considering a set
of weights {αi}i∈[0,1], where αi is a real number (possibly negative) that is increasing in
i and
∫ 1
0
αidi = 1. We assume that, for all j, the official puts weight αω(j) on group j’s
welfare, where ω is a one-to-one mapping from [0, 1] to itself. We call ω the official’s type.
We wish to capture the idea that although interest groups all know the set of weights
{αi}i∈[0,1], no group knows the particular weight that the official assigns to it. Formally,
we suppose that {αi}i∈[0,1] is common knowledge but that an interest group regards all
types ω as equally likely. If a new official comes in at date 2, we assume that her type is
drawn independently from the same uniform distribution.
From an interest group’s perspective, an official’s policy is type-dependent. We denote
a policy by yˆ ≡ {yˆj(·)},9 where yˆj(ω) is the pork assigned to group j when the official’s
types is ω.
8We assume that if exactly half the electorate votes for her, she is reelected.
9Bold letters will refer to policy vectors.
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The official’s welfare from policy yˆ when her type is ω is
U(yˆ, ω) =
∫ 1
0
αω(j)[yˆj(ω)B − y(ω)L]dj =
[∫ 1
0
αω(j)yˆj(ω)dj
]
B − y(ω)L.
An especially simple class of policies comprises those of the “natural-pecking-order”
variety, i.e., policies yˆ taking the form
yˆj(ω) =
{
1, for ω(j) ≥ io
0, for ω(j) < io
(1)
for some cut-off io. In Section 3, we will show that a natural-pecking-order equilibrium (a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with a natural-pecking-order policy) always exists and that,
under some conditions, it is the unique PBE.10
We can identify a natural-pecking-order policy yˆ with the corresponding total spending
level y =
∫ 1
0
yˆjdj =
∫ 1
io
di (which is independent of the type ω). Let α(y) ≡ αio and let
F (α) be the proportion of interest groups for which αi ≤ α (i.e., F (α) = ∫
αω(j)≤α dj).
Then, we can write the official’s welfare as a function of y:
U(y) =
[∫ ∞
α(y)
αdF (α)
]
B − yL ≡ w(y)B − yL,
where w(y) ≡ yM+(F−1(1−y)) is an increasing function of y, y = 1−F (α(y)) and M+(·)
is the truncated mean: M+(αˆ) ≡ ∫∞
αˆ
αdF (α)/(1− F (αˆ)). Note that the official’s utility
is concave in spending: Using 1− F (α(y)) = y,
∂2
∂y2
(U(y)) =
∂
∂y
(α(y)B − L) < 0.
Let α∗ > 1 be defined by
α∗B = L.
If we let x ≡ 1− F (α∗), then α∗ = α1−x.
A non-accountable official of type ω – an official without reelection concerns – will
find it optimal to choose a natural-pecking-order policy in which all interest groups j with
αω(j) ≥ α1−x get pork. She will spend x on her x-favored groups. The same is true for an
accountable official (or her replacement) at date 2.
Sections 3 and 4 will assume that the spending propensity x is known to the electorate,
and Section 5 will relax this assumption.
10A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a type-contingent policy for the official and a vote for/vote against
strategy and beliefs about the official’s type for each interest group contingent on what the group can
observe of the official’s action (opaque or transparent) such that strategies are expected-payoff maximizing
and weakly undominated and beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
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In a natural-pecking-order equilibrium, the incumbent official’s overall objective func-
tion11 is
V ≡ U(y) + p(y)R,
where p(y) is the (endogenous) probability that she is re-elected when spending y on her
y-favored groups and R is her rent from holding office. This rent reflects the perks and
ego gratification from holding office; it also embodies the official’s payoff from distributing
pork to her own favored groups at date 2.12 If x ≥ 1/2, then, through her spending, even
a non-accountable official would assemble a majority of the electorate in her favor in
a thought experiment in which she would, after all, be subject to election.13 We shall
assume, therefore, that
x < 1/2. (2)
As Section 3 shows, the official is not reelected if she targets solely her x-favored groups
constituencies (p(x) = 0), but is reelected if she distributes pork to half of the electorate
and thereby assembles a majority in her favor (p(1/2) = 1). Note that, since x < 1/2,
she will not want to provide pork to more than a majority. Henceforth we will assume
that the politician is willing to do this –i.e., to pander to a majority– if this ensures her
reelection; specifically, we posit that the rent from holding office satisfies
R > U(x)− U (1/2) . (3)
3 Basics of excessive spending
3.1 Pure pocketbook politics
In this section and the next we assume that the electorate knows the official’s spending
propensity x. In this subsection, we further suppose that each interest group acts to
maximize its expected pork (net of taxes) at date 2, i.e., it votes its “pocketbook” (in
subsection 3.2, we allow for ideological concern too).
3.1.1 Natural-pecking-order equilibria: the opaque case
Let us assume for now that interest group j observes only the pork it gets yˆj and not
the official’s total spending y (the opaque case). If the official’s equilibrium policy takes
11For more general policies yˆ, this objective function is V = U(yˆ, ω) + p({yˆj(ω)})R, if the official is of
type ω.
12Given that only a fraction x of the incumbent’s preferred groups will be favored by the new official
(whose type is drawn independently), the incumbent would clearly prefer to distribute the pork herself.
Of course, the assumption that the new official spends only on the proportion x is artificial because it
presumes that she does not need to worry about reelection. But a more elaborate model that incorporated
accountability for the new official would generate the same quantitative conclusions.
13Put differently, under natural-pecking-order strategies, the official’s spending would not depend on
her accountability or lack thereof.
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a natural-pecking-order form and y 6∈ {0, 1} (we will soon establish the latter), then an
interest group cannot detect a deviation from equilibrium, and so its probabilistic belief
that it will be favored by the official at date 2 (should the official be reelected) when it
receives pork at date 1 is
xˆ =
{
1, x ≥ y
x/y, x < y
.
This means that xˆ > x, and so the interest group is strictly better off if the official is
reelected than if she is replaced (since the replacement official will favor the interest group
only with probability x). Thus, in this case, the weakly undominated strategy for the
interest group is to vote for the official’s reelection.14 By contrast, if it does not receive
pork, its belief that it will be favored at date 2 (should the official be reelected) is
xˆ =
{ x−y
1−y , x ≥ y
0, x ≤ y ,
implying that xˆ < x. Thus, when the interest group does not get pork, voting against
the official’s reelection is the weakly undominated strategy.
We conclude that the official will be reelected if and only if y ≥ 1/2.15 If the official
chooses y < 1/2, then it is clearly best for her to select y = x, yielding payoff
U(x).
If she chooses y ≥ 1/2, then her payoff is
U(1/2) +R,
In view of assumption (3), the unique natural-pecking-order equilibrium consists of the
official choosing the natural-pecking-order policy with y = 1/2 (which leads to her reelec-
tion).16
14Strictly speaking, the interest group cannot affect the official’s reelection because it is just one group
among a continuum. So, formally, we are analyzing the case of a large but finite number of interest
groups.
15A referee correctly pointed out that the pecking-order result has to be modified when there are large
interest groups. However, the reason is not there may be groups “whose size make [them] important
for [official’s] reelection,” but rather that there may be groups that are so large that they have to be
jettisoned for the sake of other, smaller groups that are not as highly favored. For example, suppose
there are three groups: group A has size 1/4 and gives the official a net payoff of 4 per group member;
group B has size 1/2 and gives the official a net payoff of −1 per group member; and group C has size
1/4 and gives the official a net payoff of −3/2 per group member. A pecking-order outcome would have
the official give pork to groups A and B. However, because group B is “too big” (i.e., an integer problem
arises), the official is better off with groups A and C.
16The pecking-order equilibrium result does not depend on interest groups being infinitesimal and pork
being indivisible. Suppose to the contrary that there are only finitely many groups and that pork is
divisible. Note first that if there are no upper bounds on total pork and how much pork any group can
receive, the official will give an unbounded amount of pork to the most favored group. Assume therefore
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It turns out that there are no PBEs that are not natural-pecking-order equilibria. In
Appendix A.1, we establish:
Proposition 1A (opaque case) In the opaque case, there is a unique PBE, which is the
unique natural-pecking-order equilibrium (and for which y = 1/2).
Divisible pork. Let us suppose next the pork is divisible. More precisely, let us suppose
that, for some small  > 0, the official can allocate pork to an interest group in minimum
increments of  (up to a maximum allocation of 1). In this case, Proposition 1A continues
to hold. This is because the official will always give each of the x-favored groups j the
maximum amount of pork (i.e., yˆj = 1), and if she gave any other group anything other
than 1, it would know for sure that it is not x-favored.
3.1.2 Natural-pecking-order equilibria: The transparent case
We next return to indivisible pork and consider the transparent case, in which each
interest group j observes not just its own pork yˆj but the official’s total spending y.
The unique PBE from the opaque case (which entails the natural-pecking-order policy
for which y = 1/2) is still an equilibrium in the transparent case –y’s observability only
makes deviations more visible by interest groups.
But there are other equilibria as well. Indeed, any natural-pecking-order policy with
total spending y = y∗ > 1/2, where U(y∗) + R > U(x) can be sustained in perfect
Bayesian equilibrium: if the official chooses y = y∗, then interest groups (correctly) have
natural-pecking-order beliefs, and so vote for her if they get pork; if the official chooses
y 6= y∗, an off-the-equilibrium path event, then each interest group believes it will not be
favored by the official at date 2, and so they all vote against her. For that matter, y = x
can also arise in an equilibrium sustained by these same out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
These also exist PBEs that are not natural-pecking-order equilibrium. For example,
there is a PBE in which the official’s equilibrium policy is yˆ for which, for all ω,
yˆj(ω) =
{
1, if j < 1
2
0, if j ≥ 1
2
provided that
U(yˆ, ω) +R ≥ U(x) for all ω.17
that the total amount of pork is bounded at y¯. If there are no “integer problems” (see below for the case
where there are such problems), then equilibrium will be a pecking-order equilibrium in which each group
gets 2y¯ (so total pork is 1/2× 2y¯ = y¯). If the official tries to give some favored group more than 2y¯, this
will mean giving some other group less than 2y¯, and with pessimistic expectations they will decline to
vote for the official’s re-election.
17In equilibrium, those receiving pork vote against the official and those not receiving pork vote in
favor. Any interest group that does not get what it is expecting believes that it is not x-favored by the
official.
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However, if we require the PBE to satisfy the D1 refinement18 (Banks and Sobel,
1987), then we get the following proposition (which is proved in Appendix A.2).
Proposition 1B (transparent case) In the transparent case, the unique PBE satisfying
the D1 refinement is the natural-pecking-order equilibrium with y = 1/2.
Divisible pork. Interestingly, there are parameter values for which the official can get
more than U(1/2) + R in equilibrium when pork is divisible (unlike in the opaque case).
Specifically, consider the policy y∗ for which
yˆ∗j (ω) =

1, if ω(j) > 1− x
2(1−x)
, if ω(j) ∈
[
1
2
, 1− x
2(1−x)
]
0, otherwise.
For this policy, the less favored among the x-favored interest groups receive only a
small amount () of pork.
This can be beneficial to the official because it allows her to give only  pork to even
less favored interest groups and still induce them to vote for her. Indeed, this policy is
part of a PBE provided that
U(y∗, ω) > U
(
1
2
)
for all ω.
See Appendix A.2 for more detail.
Proposition 1C (divisible pork) When pork is divisible and in the transparent case, and
focusing on equilibria that satisfy D1,
(i) the indivisible-pork equilibrium is still the unique equilibrium if
K ≡
∫ 1−[x/2(1−x)]
1/2
(αi − α1−x)di ≥ 0.
(ii) if K < 0 (as is the case for affine αi), this equilibrium is no longer unique; it yields
the official’s lowest utility among equilibria satisfying D1. All equilibria involve a
reelection by a majority of one half of the voters, but some may receive little pork.
The extra equilibria in the case K < 0 arise because, when pork is divisible, the official
may benefit from the following strategy: (i) giving her most favored groups maximal pork
18A PBE satisfies the D1 refinement if for any out-of-equilibrium policy, interest groups assign zero
probability to the official being type ω if there exists another type ω′ for which the set of interest groups’
best responses causing the ω′-official to benefit from the deviation is strictly bigger than that for the
ω-official.
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(as usual), and (ii) bunching the next-most-favored groups (to whom she would also
distribute pork absent electoral concerns) with somewhat-least-favored groups (to whom
she would not) so as to build an overall re-election coalition of 1/2, and giving them all
minimal pork (epsilon). If the somewhat-least-favored groups attach sufficient probability
to being next-most-favored when they get pork (X−(1−x)
X−(1/2) = x ⇔ X = 1 − x2(1−x) , where
X is the cutoff between most-favored and next-most-favored groups), they will vote for
re-election. The official gains by spending only minimally on them; her cost is that she
must also spend only minimally on the next-most-favored groups. The gain of given less
pork in [1/2, x) outweighs the cost of giving less pork in [x, X] when K < 0.
3.1.3 The role of accountability
As in Maskin and Tirole (2004), we can compare the allocation resulting from an elected
official to that which would prevail under a non-accountable official. If an official does not
have to run for election, she will set y = x. We conclude, therefore, that an accountable
official (representative democracy) leads to excessive spending.
We can also consider direct democracy, in which the fiscal policy is chosen by citizens
and is not delegated to an official. There always exist a continuum of equilibria in which
a collection of (slightly more than) half of the population forms and allocates the benefits
to itself in a package referendum (this coalition is stable in the absence of monetary
transfers). Direct democracy then yields yDD = 1/2. Appendix A.3 shows that when
B < L/2, all equilibria satisfying coalition-proofness a` la Bernheim et al (1987) yield this
amount of pork.
3.2 Extension: Ideological voting
We now extend Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)’s key insight on how targeted campaign
promises are reflected in policy. We suppose that in group j a fraction vj , now possibly
smaller than 1, votes its pocketbook, i.e., maximizes its expected second-period benefit
net of taxes.19 The remaining fraction 1 − vj votes “ideologically” (or, more generally,
for reasons unrelated to the date-1 policy, e.g., the candidate’s character or appearance).
Of these, a random fraction φ with cumulative distribution function H and density h on
[0, 1] will vote for the incumbent and a fraction 1 − φ will vote for her rival, regardless
of the date-1 policy (we assume that φ is the same for all interest groups for notational
simplicity). We assume that the density is non-decreasing (h′ ≥ 0). This assumption
guarantees the concavity of the relevant programs.
In this setting, the official will not necessarily prefer to spend on interest groups j for
which αω(j) is higher. Thus, the natural-pecking-order assumption on beliefs no longer
makes sense as stated. But we can generalize it in the following way. A “generalized
19One could also take B and L to be interest-group specific.
12
natural-pecking-order” equilibrium is such that beneficiaries of pork (yˆj = 1) vote for the
incumbent, while the others vote against her. The two notions coincide under symmetric
interest group greed (i.e. vj = v for all j).
Proposition 2 (some ideological voting) If some of the electorate votes ideologically rather
than pocketbook, there exists a unique generalized natural-pecking-order equilibrium, in
which beneficiaries of pork, and only them, vote for the incumbent. Interest group ranked
j receives pork iff αω(j)B + h
1−v vjR ≥ L. Public spending increases with the level of rents
from office and the intensity of electoral competition. An interest group is more likely to
receive pork, the more pocketbook-oriented it is.
Proposition 2, which is proved in Appendix A.4, confirms for our model results that
were developed in other setups. For instance, the idea that pocketbook-oriented groups
are more likely to receive pork is reminiscent of “high clout” electoral groups being those
who are more greedy, i.e. most likely to shift their votes in response to expected pri-
vate consumption (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and
Londregan, 1996, 1998).
4 Legal limits on spending to impose on an elected
official
The model in Section 3 incorporates the basic mechanics of pork-barrel spending. It
presumes, however, that all public spending is wasteful, and so implies that a simple legal
provision would be optimal: a prohibition on all public expenditure. We now turn to
a richer model in which some spending is worthwhile and nontrivial spending caps are
called for. Constraints on government fiscal policy are common place in practice. For
example, most U.S. states have a balanced budget requirement; the Stability Pact in the
European Union limits the budget deficit to (cyclically adjusted) three percent of GDP
and gross government debt to sixty percent of GDP,20 although the constraint has had
only limited effectiveness;21 and in the United Kingdom, the deficit is not to exceed net
capital formation (over the business cycle).
We will look at the optimal spending cap. Conceptually, our insights more broadly
apply to “balanced budget requirements” and “deficit caps” too, but we cannot formally
analyze those alternative constraints because our model does not explicitly deal with
where the revenue for spending comes from (e.g., from taxes or debt).
20Or if it exceeds these levels, to converge to it at “a satisfactory pace”.
21First, nations accumulate large off-balance-sheet liabilities, so that public debt vastly underestimates
the actual government liabilities. Second, the enforcement mechanism has little bite; although it has been
strengthened in the wake of the euro crisis, the governance of budget discipline remains a weak point of
the eurozone construction.
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Accordingly, we will assume that y is at least partially verifiable by a court at date 1
(see below) and that a legal (constitutional or statutory) spending cap can be enforced.22
We will argue that using a spending cap to constrain pork-barrel spending runs into
two difficulties. First, a tight budget constraint induces a substitution away from desirable
public spending. And, second, it induces the politician to use spending technologies that
are inefficient but whose costs are not immediately observable; i.e., it encourages the use
of off-balance-sheet liabilities. Formally, suppose that the official faces a spending limit
G. Assume that she chooses a pork-barrel policy yˆ with total expenditure y =
∫
yˆjdj
and also decides what fraction σ of its cost is observable (how much is “on the balance
sheet”). Specifically, she chooses a level of transparency σ(≤ 1) so that only σyL counts
toward the spending limit but the actual cost is
yL [σ +D1(1− σ)] ,
where D1 – the deadweight loss from distorting spending to keep it unobservable – satisfies
D1(0) = 0, D
′
1(0) = 1, and D
′′
1 > 0. The distinction between actual and observed spending
and the concomitant deadweight loss reflect the many opportunities that governments
have themselves to shift liabilities off-balance-sheet (e.g. changes in pension benefits or
the provision of costly contingent guarantees on social accounts, individual assets, firms or
central banks), or conversely to bring cash forward in time at the expense of future revenue
(perhaps implying a discount on the sale of state assets). We assume that interest groups
observe at least their own pork; that is, they are able to figure out what their benefit is,
whether it is on- or off-balance sheet (presumably, if they do not, the official will explain
to them when yˆj = 1, as it is in her interest to do so).
Assume that, in addition to pork-barrel spending, the public official can undertake
public good spending g generating surplus
B0 −D2(g0 − g),
where g0 is the first-best optimal public good level and D2(0) = 0, D
′
2(0) = 1 and D
′′
2 > 0.
For simplicity we will assume that all of g is on the balance sheet, although as in the case of
pork spending, we could alternatively introduce a distinction between actual and observed
spending without changing our conclusions (there are many ways, including public-private
partnerships, to frontload or backload public good expenditures). We assume that all
citizens enjoy the public good equally, and so the provision of the public good does not
convey any signal as to the politician’s preferences among interest groups.23 Thus it does
not matter whether voters observe g or not. The model is otherwise the same as that
of Section 3.2, with vj = v for all j (so we can indeed focus on a natural-pecking-order
equilibrium).
22A substantial literature in public finance discusses the credibility of such enforcement and the nature
of the institutions that are likely to make it effective (see, in particular, Calmfors, 2005).
23In practice, public good provision does have redistributive consequences, and thus there is a “con-
tinuum” between purely targeted spending (pork in our model) and untargeted spending (public good in
our model).
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The politician is re-elected if and only if
vy + (1− v)φ ≥ v(1− y) + (1− v)(1− φ).
And so, if the official faces spending cap G, the optimal natural-pecking-order policy is
given by:
max
{y,σ,g}
{[∫ 1
0
αiyidi
]
B − [yL[σ +D1(1− σ)] + g] +B0 −D2(g0 − g) (4)
+
[
1−H
(
1− 2vy
2(1− v)
)]
R
}
such that
∫ 1
0
yidi = y and
g + σyL ≤ G (5)
Proposition 3 (impact of a spending cap) In a natural-pecking-order equilibrium, a looser
deficit cap increases pork-barrel spending. However, it also encourages desirable public-
good spending and induces the government to use more efficient forms of pork with lower
off-balance-sheet liabilities.24
Next we explore the implications of variation in the rent R. For tractability reasons,
we here assume that the density h is uniform.
Proposition 4 (impact of rent from office)
(i) Suppose that H is distributed uniformly. Then, in a natural-pecking-order equilib-
rium, holding G constant, an increase in the rent from holding office, R, induces
the official to increase pork-barrel spending, to decrease the fraction of that spending
that is efficient, and to decrease public good spending.
(ii) Suppose that F and H are uniform distributions. Then an increase in rent leads
to an increase in the budget cap. In particular, elected officials are granted larger
budgets than nonelected officials, ceteris paribus.
Proposition 4(i) implies that if, for the same capG, we consider two spending situations
– one in which the election is imminent, the other in which it is still far off – we may expect
the public official to undertake more pork-barrel spending, less public-good spending, and
more off-balance-sheet spending in the former case. This is because, given discounting, the
24Inefficient project choice here results from a desire to hide government liabilities, not from an intrinsic
preference for inefficient projects. By contrast, the government in Robinson and Torvik (2005) deliberately
and openly chooses inefficient projects (“white elephants”) so as to enhance the chances of being re-elected.
Efficient projects would be continued even if the challenger came to power while only the incumbent would
pursue inefficient ones. Inefficiency then “forces” the interest group to vote for the incumbent.
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relative magnitude of R (compared with the rest of the official’s payoff) may be especially
high just before an election. Of course, that R is higher closer to an election is just an
assumption conditioning this result. The standard justification (invoked in the political
business cycle literature25) is that voters’ memories are short. Another possibility is that
the official’s preferences follow a Markov process;26 incentives to signal are then higher
closer to the election.
While obtained through functional form restrictions for tractability reasons, Proposi-
tion 4(ii) seems robust and is new to the literature. The intuition is that, as R increases,
an elected official will spend more on pork, and so G must increase to prevent worthwhile
spending from being crowded-out and off-balance-sheet spending from increasing. For the
same reasons, authorized spending should increase as an election nears.
The implication that ceteris paribus, accountable officials have larger budgets seems
to be borne out by practice in democratic countries: Non-accountable officials have either
relatively low budgets (antitrust, regulation) or budgets over which little discretion can
be exercised (social security).
5 Unknown spending propensity
We have so far assumed that the official’s overall spending propensity is common knowl-
edge. Voters, however, may face uncertainty as to the desired spending level and not only
its structure. When the electorate is uncertain about the level as well as the distribution
of the official’s spending priorities, an accountable official faces conflicting incentives: On
the one hand, she wishes to seem congruent with as many individual interest groups as is
consistent with reelection. On the other hand, she does not want the electorate to form
the impression that she is a big spender.
We return to the simplified model of Section 3.1 and suppose that there are two types
of officials: “Low spenders,” in proportion ρ, favor a fraction xL of interest groups. “High
spenders,” in proportion 1− ρ, favor a fraction x = xH > xL of interest groups. Thus the
expected pork-barrel intensity of a non-accountable official is
yNA = x¯ = (1− ρ)xH + ρxL.
As with known spending propensity, the spending propensities are derived from under-
lying distributions over weights. Namely, let FH(α) and FL(α) denote the cumulative
distribution functions over weights α ∈ [0,+∞), and EH(.) and EL(.) the corresponding
expectation operators. As earlier we normalize expected weights to be equal to 1:
EH [α] = EL[α] = 1,
25For example, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find strong evidence of political spending cycles in
Russia in the period 1996-2003.
26Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) build a theory of income and dividend smoothing on a similar assumption
(there, managerial productivity or adequacy to the job varies according to a Markov process).
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and we will be interested in the case where xL and xH are less than 1/2. The formal
condition for H types to be high spenders is for any cutoff weight generating pork level
below 1/2 for the low spender, the high spender spends more than the low spender:
FH(α) < FL(α) for all α such that 1/2 ≤ FL(α) < 1.
Letting α∗ ≡ L/B (as before), we have
xL = 1− FL(α∗) < xH = 1− FH(α∗) < 1/2.
Next, for θ ∈ {L,H} let
Uθ(y) ≡
[∫ +∞
αθ(y)
αdFθ(α)
]
B − yL
where
1− Fθ(αθ(y)) ≡ y
Note that utilities are concave in spending and that the high spender has a higher marginal
demand for spending “in the relevant range”:
∂UH(y)
∂y
− ∂UL(y)
∂y
= [αH(y)− αL(y)]B > 0 for all y such that y ≤ 1/2.
Finally, we assume that the rent from keeping office R is the same for both types (this
assumption is much stronger than needed), and that this rent from office satisfies condition
(3) for both θ:
Uθ(1/2) +R > Uθ(xθ) for θ ∈ {L,H}; (6)
that is, under symmetric information about spending propensity, both types seek reelec-
tion by distributing more pork than they would wish to under non accountability.
We consider two polar information structures: The date-1 policy yˆ is transparent if
each minority j observes both yˆj and y before the date-2 election.
27 The date-1 policy
yˆ is non-transparent or opaque if each minority j learns only the value of yˆj before the
date-2 election. Non-transparency of course requires that the pork-barrel policy’s cost
be delayed. Indeed transparency and opaqueness are two polar cases of the accounting
manipulation technology introduced in Section 4. The policy is necessarily opaque if
putting expenses off-balance sheet is costless (D1(1− σ) = 1− σ) and transparent if it is
infinitely costly (D′1 = +∞).
We look for a natural-pecking-order equilibrium.
27Given the focus on natural-pecking-order strategies, it does not matter whether the interest groups
observe y or the full yˆ.
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5.1 Opaque policy
To study representative democracy, let us first assume that the policy is opaque; that is,
each interest group j learns only whether it received a benefit (yˆj = 1) or not (yˆj = 0).
Let yH and yL denote the equilibrium spendings (measures of interest groups receiving a
benefit) of the high- and low-spenders. Let xˆ1 and xˆ0 denote a voter’s expectations of xθ
conditional, respectively, on being and not being a spending beneficiary. Similarly, let zˆ1
and zˆ0 denote the probabilities of receiving date-2 benefits if the official stays in office,
conditional respectively on receiving and not receiving a first-period benefit.
We look for a pure-strategy perfect bayesian equilibrium, and show that either the
(natural-pecking-order) equilibrium is unique or there exists a second equilibrium. Let
x+ ≡ E(x
2)
E(x)
> E(x) = x¯
(where expectations are taken with respect to the prior belief ρ). x+ is the posterior mean
of x conditional on being a beneficiary when the official distributes benefits only to her
favored groups (yH = xH , yL = xL) at date 1.
Similarly,
x− ≡ E[(1− x)x]
1− x¯ (< x¯)
is the posterior mean of x conditional on being a non-beneficiary. It is not hard to show
that
x+ − x¯
1− x¯ =
x¯− x−
x¯
.
Proposition 5 (opaque policy) When the official’s spending propensity is unknown and
the policy is opaque, being a beneficiary carries both good news (one will be favored by the
incumbent tomorrow) and bad news (the probability that the incumbent is a high spender
has increased).
(i) A high-spending equilibrium, in which the politician builds a majority of interest
groups by indicating her congruence with the latter (yH = yL = 1/2) always exists.
(ii) For generic payoffs this high-spending equilibrium is unique unless pork-barrel is suf-
ficiently costly to the electorate (B/L ≤ (x+ − x¯)/(1− x¯)), in which case a second,
“Groucho Marx” equilibrium also exists. In the latter equilibrium, spending is as un-
der a non-accountable official, and the politician is re-elected by non-beneficiaries.28
28This is a reminiscent of Groucho Marx’s famous remark: “I would never belong to a club that would
admit me as a member.”
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The Groucho Marx equilibrium, if it exists, is interesting in that it illustrates in a stark
way the negative news conveyed by being a pork recipient: in situations of very low net
benefit from pork, receiving pork can induce beneficiaries to vote against the incumbent,
while non-beneficiaries vote for the incumbent, whom they perceive as a fiscal conservative.
Nonetheless, we find this outcome empirically dubious, and in case of multiplicity, we
will focus on the more natural equilibrium in which it is beneficiaries who vote for the
incumbent.
Proof of Proposition 5: There are two sets of interest groups, spending beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries. There are therefore four possible voting patterns at the reelection stage:
a) Everyone votes for the official. This requires 29
zˆ1B − xˆ1L ≥ x¯(B − L)
and
zˆ0B − xˆ0L ≥ x¯(B − L),
where zˆ1 and xˆ1 are the probabilities of being favored and expected pork in the sec-
ond period conditional on being a beneficiary in the first period, and zˆ0 and xˆ0 are the
corresponding variables conditional on not being a beneficiary.
Because the official is re-elected regardless of her behavior, she selects her preferred
action:
yH = xH and yL = xL.
This implies
zˆ1 = 1 , zˆ0 = 0 , xˆ1 = x
+ , xˆ0 = x
−. (7)
And so, the two inequalities imply that
B − x+L ≥ x¯(B − L)
and
−x−L ≥ x¯(B − L).
Rearranging, we obtain
x+ − x¯
1− x¯ ≤
B
L
≤ x¯− x
−
x¯
. (8)
But because the left- and right-hand sides of (8) are equal, this voting pattern can be an
equilibrium configuration only in a knife-edge case.
b) Nobody votes for the official. Intuitively, in this configuration, beneficiaries are
dissatisfied with the official because they infer that she is likely to be a high spender;
non-beneficiaries are dissatisfied because they are not favored. Clearly, the official selects
yH = xH and yL = xL.
29Recall that we assume that when indifferent, the voter votes for the incumbent. We could alternatively
assume that he votes for the challenger; this makes no difference.
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And so (7) holds. Thus for equilibrium we need:
B − x+L < x¯(B − L) and − x−L < x¯(B − L).
Rearranging, we obtain
x¯− x−
x¯
<
B
L
<
x+ − x¯
1− x¯ ,
which, since the left- and right-hand sides are equal, is impossible.
c) Only beneficiaries vote for the official. This voting pattern corresponds to
zˆ1B − xˆ1L ≥ x¯(B − L)
and
zˆ0B − xˆ0L < x¯(B − L).
And thus
yH = yL = 1/2 , zˆ1 = 2x¯ , zˆ0 = 0 , xˆ1 = xˆ0 = x¯.
The voter learns nothing about the official’s aggregate spending preferences, and the two
inequalities hold for all values of the parameters.
d) Only non-beneficiaries vote for official (Groucho Marx equilibrium). In this voting
pattern, beneficiaries do not vote for an official who favored them as this is a bad signal
about her aggregate spending propensity, xˆ1 = x
+ > x¯, but non-beneficiaries (who per-
ceive average spending propensity to be xˆ0 = x
− < x¯) do. The official then gets re-elected
and favors her preferred groups (yθ = xθ), and equilibrium obtains if and only if
B − x+L < x¯(B − L)
and
−x−L ≥ x¯(B − L);
that is, if and only if
B
L
<
x+ − x¯
1− x¯ ≡
x¯− x−
x¯
.

5.2 Transparency
Consider now the polar case in which interest groups observe not only what they receive
but also the total spending y by the politician. The same countervailing incentives under
an opaque system are still in play. The official would like to convince individual interest
groups that she is willing to spend for them, while at the same time appearing to be a
low spender. But we would expect the latter incentive to be stronger under transparency
and so transparency to induce more restraint.
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The signaling game under transparency has many equilibria, and we will content
ourselves with a study of equilibria satisfying D1. In case of multiplicity of such equilibria,
we will use Pareto dominance to single out a unique one. Let p(y) denote the probability
of reelection when aggregate spending is y.
Assume that
UH(xL) +R > UH(xH) (9)
(the electoral concern is strong enough to induce a high spender to choose the low spender’s
preferred spending level if that will get her re-elected) and
Uθ(0) +R < Uθ(xθ) for all θ (10)
(the electoral concern is not strong enough to induce an official to forego current pork-
barrel spending altogether).
Finally, let
b1 ≡ ρ
[
xH − xL
(1 + ρ)xH − ρxL
]
and b2(yL) ≡ (1− ρ)
[
xH − xL
ρxL + (1− ρ)xH − xL−yL1−yL
]
.
Let y∗L and y
∗∗
L , with y
∗
L < y
∗∗
L ≤ xL be defined by:
UH(xH) ≡ UH(y∗L) +R
and
y∗∗L ≡
{
xL, if UH
(
1/2
) ≥ UH(xL)
y, where UH
(
1/2
)
= UH(y) and y < xL, if UH
(
1/2
)
< UH(xL).
Any Pareto optimal equilibrium outcome either coincides with the standard equilib-
rium outcome under opaqueness or involves less spending (for each type) than in that
equilibrium. Indeed, for some parameter values, there are equilibria in which spending is
below that of a non-accountable official.
Proposition 6 (transparency) Assume beliefs satisfy the natural-pecking-order assump-
tion. When the official’s spending propensity is unknown and the policy is transparent, the
politician faces a dilemma between indicating congruence with individual interest groups
and signaling a low overall spending propensity. The equilibrium satisfying D1 and Pareto
dominance is unique and exhibits even more restraint than under a non-accountable of-
ficial when pork is socially very costly. The high spender is not reelected, yH = xH and
yL = y
∗
L < xL if B/L ≤ min {b1, b2(y∗L)}. If b1 ≤ B/L ≤ b2(y∗∗L ), the equilibrium is
separating with yH = 1/2 and yL = min{xL, y∗∗L }; both the high and the low spenders are
reelected. If b2(xL) ≤ B/L ≤ b1, then yθ = xθ for θ ∈ {L,H}, and the official always being
voted out of power is an equilibrium. Finally, if pork is not very costly (B/L ≥ b2(xL)), the
equilibrium is the same, higher-spending equilibrium as under known spending propensity.
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Proof: We look in turn for separating equilibria in which (a) only the low type is reelected,
(b) the official is never reelected and (c) both types are reelected. We then look for a
pooling equilibrium, in which both types are necessarily reelected.
1. Separating equilibrium in which the low but not the high type is re-elected. In this
case, the high type may as well choose her static bliss point:
yH = xH .
Furthermore, from (6), it must be the case that an official known to be a high spender is
not able to assemble a minimal majority of beneficiaries to re-elect her:30
(2xH)B − xHL ≤ x¯(B − L) ⇐⇒ b1 ≡ ρ
[
xH − xL
(1 + ρ)xH − ρxL
]
≥ B
L
(11)
If the low type must assemble a majority to be reelected, then (6) implies the high type
has the incentive to imitate. Hence, in equilibrium, the low type must be voted for not
only by beneficiaries, but also by non-beneficiaries. A non-beneficiary still has probability
[xL − yL]/[1− yL] of being in the official’s favored list. So unanimous reelection requires
that:(
xL − yL
1− yL
)
B−xLL ≥ x¯(B−L) ⇐⇒ b2(yL) ≡ (1− ρ)
[
xH − xL
ρxL + (1− ρ)xH − xL−yL1−yL
]
≥ B
L
(12)
In equilibrium, we cannot have yL = xL, otherwise, from (9) the high spender would want
to mimic the low spender. The separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion
thus involves
yL = y
∗
L < xL,
with
UH(xH) = UH(y
∗
L) +R. (13)
To see this, note that, from (9) and (10), there exists y∗L satisfying (13). Furthermore,
∂UH
∂y
(y) >
∂UL
∂y
(y)
implies
UH(xH)− UH(y∗L) > UL(xH)− UL(y∗L),
and so (13) and xH > xL imply
UL(xL) < UL(y
∗
L) +R.
30Note that if the high type deviates to y = 1/2, the worst possible beliefs are that she is believed to
be a high type. Furthermore, the natural-pecking-order assumption implies that a beneficiary believes
he has probability 2xH of being among those favored by the high type. So condition (11) is a necessary
and sufficient condition, for the high type not wanting to deviate.
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Hence, the configuration (yL , yH) = (y
∗
L, xH) constitutes a separating equilibrium if
B/L ≤min {b1, b2(y∗L)}, and because y∗L is the smallest deviation from xL that satisfies the
high type’s incentive constraint, the equilibrium satisfies D1. In this case, transparency
induces restraint.31
2. Separating equilibrium in which no type is reelected. In the absence of reelection,
yL = xL and yH = xH . This requires that (11) be satisfied (for the same reason as in
footnote 30) and that the low type not be reelected when choosing yL = xL. So, this
equilibrium exists when
b2(xL) ≤ B
L
≤ b1.
3. Separating equilibrium in which both types are re-elected. In this configuration yH =
1/2, and (11) must be violated while (12) is satisfied for whatever yL ≤ xL is picked by
the low spender. In this case,
y∗∗L = xL if UH(1/2) ≥ UH(xL),
and
y∗∗L < xL if UH(1/2) = UH(y
∗∗
L ) < UH(xL).
Hence, this universal reelection equilibrium requires that b1 ≤ B/L ≤ b2(y∗∗L ).
4. Pooling equilibria. Finally, a pooling equilibrium with universal reelection requires
building up a majority, so
yL = yH = y
o ≥ 1/2 and UL(yo) +R ≥ UL(xL)
and yields the high-spending outcome of Section 5.1. For this to be an equilibrium, it
must be the case that setting yL = xL does not get the low-type re-elected, i.e., (12) for
yL = xL, or b2(xL) ≥ B/L is violated. Conversely b2(xL) ≤ B/L suffices to construct a
pooling equilibrium.
Ranking of equilibrium payoffs. Let us compare the four types of equilibria: 1. separating,
reelection of low spender; 2. separating, no reelection; 3. separating, universal reelection;
4. pooling, universal reelection.
Note first that the type-2 equilibrium is always dominated for the official by the type-1
equilibrium. Next, an equilibrium of type 1 is dominated by equilibria of type 3 and 4. The
high spender receives UH(xH), which she can guarantee herself in any equilibrium. The
low type receives UL(y
∗
L) +R, against the larger UL(y
∗∗
L ) +R in a type-3 equilibrium and
against UL(1/2) +R in a type-4 equilibrium. In the latter equilibrium, selecting y
∗
L would
31More generally, in any separating equilibrium in which the high type is not elected there is less
pork-barrel than under a non-accountable official.
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from D1 be interpreted as coming from type L and guarantee reelection whenever a type-1
equilibrium also exists. Finally, a type-3 equilibrium dominates a type-4 equilibrium when
they co-exist. The high spender receives UH(1/2) +R in both. The low spender receives
in a type-3 equilibrium UL(y
∗∗
L ) +R ≥ UL(1/2) +R whenever a type-3 equilibrium exists.

Comparison: If we rule out, as we did, the Groucho Marx equilibrium in the opaque case,
transparency is always (at least weakly) conducive to restraint. However, the analysis of
Section 4 would still apply if we added socially desirable public spending and/or time-
shifting ability. Transparency would then induce the official to cut down on desirable
public spending and to increase the cost of public spending through off-balance-sheet
liabilities. While opaque policies never lead to off-balance-sheet financing and curtailment
of efficient public goods, transparency incentivizes such behaviors. This of course does
not provide a strong argument for opacity; rather it says that a particular attention
to off-balance-sheet manipulations and transparency concerning public good provision is
called for when imposing a spending cap or promoting transparency of the overall level
of spending.
Empirical evidence: This analysis speaks to the current debate about the impact on
the probability of reelection of austerity and more broadly reforms (which, like pork
barrel, have both efficiency and redistributive consequences). Drazen and Eslava (2010)
find evidence that voters react positively to pork and negatively to overall spending, in
conformity with this paper’s analysis. Brender and Drazen, looking at 74 democracies,
find that an increase in public deficit in an election year does not increase the probability
of reelection; it actually decreases it in established democracies (as it does at the state or
local level in the studies of Peltzman 1992, Brender 2003, and Drazen-Eslava 2010). More
casually, politicians who in the recent past have conducted large scale reforms of the State
and/or the labor market were either reelected (Australia, Canada and Sweden) or voted
out (Germany). Obviously further empirical work in the area would be very useful. From
the analysis, we know that whether in the end pork allows the official to be reelected, an
official who opts for a small level of spending really wants to let this be known to the
electorate.
Beyond opaque and transparent policies : If there is a probability between 0 and 1 that
total spending is revealed to the public, spending behavior is weakly decreasing in the
level of transparency.
6 Summary and discussion
This paper offers a complementary approach to the well-established and useful “grabbing”
theories of budget deficit. Our “pandering” approach captures the idea that politicians
like to signal that they stand for individual groups’ interest or share their identity, while
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being fiscal conservatives overall. Besides adding realism, pandering also allows us to
study issues, such as transparency and off-balance sheet activities, that are intrinsically
linked to informational asymmetries between rulers and voters.
In the model, voters who receive benefits from political incumbents are more likely
to re-elect these incumbents because they truly learn something about the incumbents’
stance toward them. This gives the politicians in office an incentive to distribute pork to
constituencies, and generates excessive public spending.
A spending cap, such as those prevailing in the European Union or many American
states, curbs pork, but also reduces the provision of public goods, and furthermore en-
courages politicians to shift expenditures off-balance-sheet, at the cost of increased total
spending. The optimal cap should be looser for an accountable official, especially in years
just prior to elections.
The desire to appear fiscally conservative provides a countervailing incentive for politi-
cians to limit pork. Even if expenses can be shifted off-balance-sheet and so total expenses
are unobserved, receiving pork suggests that the politician is a high spender. A greater
transparency of public expenditure reduces pork.
In our view, an important open research area in public finance, macroeconomics and
industrial organization is that of public accounting. Like in the private sector, and perhaps
more so because of the absence of stock market values, accounting is key to accountability.
While a substantial policy literature has studied the European Stability Pact and various
other fiscal rules, little research has been directed toward a theory of public accounting.32
32Maskin-Tirole (2007) touches on the public accounting treatment in a very specific context, that of
public procurement, and argues that cost-plus contracts are vulnerable to a new form of adverse selection,
as politicians may strategically award such contracts for “white elephant” projects. It further shows how
private financing of high-powered incentives schemes may help “securitize” (make more transparent)
public debt.
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A Appendix
A.1 Uniqueness of equilibrium in the opaque case
Proposition 1A In the opaque case, there is a unique PBE, which is the unique natural-
pecking-order equilibrium (and for which y = 1/2).
Proof: We prove the result via three claims.
Claim 1: In a PBE, the official gets reelected regardless of her type.
Proof of claim: Suppose type ω does not get reelected in equilibrium. Then she must be
choosing a natural-pecking-order policy with y = x, and every interest group that gets
pork votes for her reelection. Hence, for any out-of-equilibrium policy, any interest group
that gets pork must vote for reelection. Hence, if she chooses the natural-pecking-order
policy with y = 1/2, she will be reelected and, from (3), will be better off, a contradiction.
Claim 2: In a PBE, every x-favored interest group is offered pork.
Proof of Claim: If, for type ω, some x-favored group is not offered pork, the type ω official
can improve her payoff by offering it, a contradiction.
Notice that in view of Claim 2, any interest group that is offered pork cannot distin-
guish between an equilibrium and an out-of-equilibrium policy.
Claim 3: In a PBE (or in response to any out-of-equilibrium policy), any group that is
offered pork votes for reelection.
Proof of claim: Suppose some group j that is offered pork votes against reelection. Group
j has an ex-ante probability x of being x-favored, in which case (from claim 2) it would
be offered pork in equilibrium. So, for it to be an undominated strategy for j to vote
against reelection, j must be offered pork with probability 1 in equilibrium. In particular,
j must be offered pork when not x-favored. But then the official would be better off not
offering j pork, a contradiction.
In view of claims 1 and 3, it is optimal for the official to offer pork to an interest group
if and only if it is 1/2-favored.
A.2 Uniqueness of equilibrium in the transparent case
Proposition 1B In the transparent case, the unique PBE satisfying D1 is the natural-
pecking-order equilibrium with y = 1/2 (assuming indivisible pork).
Proposition 1C (divisible pork) When pork is divisible and in the transparent case, and
focusing on equilibria that satisfy D1,
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(i) the indivisible-pork equilibrium is still the unique equilibrium if
K ≡
∫ 1−[x/2(1−x)]
1/2
(αi − α1−x)di ≥ 0.
(ii) if K < 0 (as is the case for affine αi), this equilibrium is no longer unique; it yields
the official’s lowest utility among equilibria satisfying D1. All equilibria involve a
reelection by a majority of one half of the voters, but some may receive little pork.
Proof. We first note that, whether symmetric or not, whether pork is divisible or not, the
incumbent’s equilibrium utility is, under D1, at least equal to U(1/2) + R. Suppose it
were not, and let U∗(ω) denote the equilibrium utility of type ω and ω0 ≡ arg inf U∗(ω).
Consider the policy yˆ(ω0) consisting in giving pork yˆj = 1 to interest groups ranked by
ω0 above 1/2 (i.e. according to ω0’s natural peking order). So U(yˆ(ω0), ω0) = U(1/2) >
U(yˆ(ω0), ω) for all ω whose preferences differ from those of ω0 on a set of strictly positive
measure. Let
P(yˆ(ω0), ω) = {p|U∗(ω) < U(yˆ(ω0), ω) + pR} .
The set P is larger for ω0 than for any other ω (except those “equivalent types”
satisfying U∗(ω) = U∗(ω0) and differing from ω0 only on a set of measure 0). Thus
following yˆj(ω0) = 1, interest group j should vote for the incumbent, who therefore will
be reelected. So U∗(ω) ≥ U(1/2) + R for all ω. But the only policy that attains payoff
U(1/2) +R is the natural-pecking-order policy with y = 1/2.
When pork is divisible, the upper bound on payoff is again U(1/2) +R iff
K ≡
∫ 1− x
2(1−x)
1
2
(αi − α1−x)di ≥ 0.
Furthermore, the upper bound, which is also the lower bound, can be implemented only
by giving pork to the 50% preferred groups. But K may be negative. For example, for
affine αi
K =
∫ 1− x
2(1−x)
1
2
[i− (1− x)]di < 0
with strict inequality unless x = 1/2.
If K < 0, the upper bound is reached through
yi =

0 for i < 1
2
ε for i ∈
[
1
2
, 1− x
2(1−x)
]
(ε arbitrarily small)
1 for i > 1− x
2(1−x) .
Note that this two-pork-level outcome can only be an equilibrium if yˆ is observed by
interest groups, and not just yˆk. Otherwise, the official would deviate to picking yi = 1
for i ≥ 1− x.
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A.3 Direct democracy
Suppose that the status quo involves no perk for anyone, that a majority of votes in favor
of an allocation yˆ is required to overcome the status quo, and that all allocations are
on the ballot33. Consider an equilibrium outcome yˆ∗. Let W ∗ ≡ {j∣∣yˆ∗jB − yˆ∗L > 0}
denote the set of winners relative to the status quo, and w∗ its weight (i.e. the fraction
of winners). We look for a coalition-proof equilibrium.
Suppose, first, that w∗ < 1/2. Then a coalition of size 1/2 among non-winners (interest
groups not in W ∗) could vote for another allocation giving pork 1 to its members and
pork 0 to everyone else. This coalition would gain provided that B > L/2.
So assume that w∗ ≥ 1/2. If w∗ > 1/2, any sub-coalition of size 1/2 would benefit
strictly from voting for an allocation yˆ giving the same pork to its members and no pork
to non-coalition members.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
In a generalized natural-pecking-order equilibrium, the incumbent is re-elected if and only
if ∫
viyidi+ (1− v)φ ≥
∫
vi(1− yi)di+ (1− v)(1− φ), 34
where v ≡ ∫ vidi. And so
p(y) ≡ 1−H
12 +
∫
vi(1− 2yi)di
2(1− v)
 .
The official’s optimal policy solves
max
y
{U(y) + p(y)R},
where
U(y) ≡
∫
αi(yiB − yL)di
Thus, interest group of rank i receives pork (yi = 1) if and only if
αiB +
h
1− v viR ≥ L. (A.1)
33Alternatively, one could consider a citizen candidate model as in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and
Besley and Coate (1997).
34We assume that the ideological vote can push the election one way or the other (that is, we rule out
corner solutions). If vj = v for all j, this implies that v ≤ 1/2.
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Interest group j, when receiving pork, knows that αω(j) ≥ max
{
0,
L− h
1−v vjR
B
}
and so
votes for the incumbent. And conversely when interest group j does not receive pork.
From (A.1), an interest group’s ability to attract pork depends not only on how favored
it is (i.e., on αω(j)), but also on how pocketbook-oriented it is (i.e., on vj).
35 Its prospects
for pork improve with a local increase in h, which implies that the probability of victory
is more responsive to a small swing in voting. That is, the interest group is more likely
to receive pork if the election is hotly contested. Finally, pork will also increase with R;
the official will be willing to spend more, the higher the value she attaches to office.
Finally, consider uniqueness. Consider two generalized natural-pecking-order equilib-
ria with total spending y and y˜, where y > y˜, or equivalently from (A.1) h > h˜. This
also implies that {i|y˜i = 1} ⊂ {i|yi = 1}, which in turn implies, together with the density
being non-decreasing that h ≤ h˜, a contradiction.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The first-order conditions for σ and g are:
D′1(1− σ) = D′2(g0 − g) = 1 + µ, (A.2)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier for (5). The first-order condition with respect to yi is:
yi = 1 ⇐⇒ αiB + hv
1− vR ≥ [σ +D1(1− σ) + µσ]L = [D1(1− σ) + σD
′
1(1− σ)]L
(A.3)
If the spending cap G is increases, then µ decreases. Thus from (A.2), σ and g increase.
That is,
dσ
dG
> 0 and
dg
dG
> 0. (A.4)
Now, the derivative of the right-hand side of the inequality in (A.3) is
−σD′′1
dσ
dG
L < 0.
The derivative of the left-hand side of (A.3) taken at the cutoff α(y) so as to make (A.3)
an equality is
[
dα
dy
B − ( v
1−v
)2
h′R
]
dy
dG
. Hence because h′ ≥ 0 and dα/dy < 0,
dy
dG
> 0.

35Notice that if vj is sufficiently low, an interest group j receives pork only if αω(j)B > L and so when
the vj ’s are low, less than a majority of interests groups get pork.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) From (5) we can replace g in (4) with G− Lyσ resulting in objective function
max
y,σ
{∫
αiyiBdi− yL [σ +D1(1− σ)]− [G− σyL] +W −D2(g0 −G+ σyL)
+
[
1−H
(
1− 2vy
2(1− v)
)]
R
}
We thus obtain first-order conditions for σ and yi :
D′1(1− σ) = D′2(g0 −G+ σyL) (A.5)
and
yi = 1 ⇐⇒ αiB −D1(1− σ)L−D′2(g0 −G+ σyL)σL+
hv
1− vR ≥ 0. (A.6)
Consider how the optimal values of σ and y depend on the rent R. Differentiating (A.5)
with respect to R, we obtain36
−D′′1
dσ
dR
−D′′2
(
y
dσ
dR
+ σ
dy
dR
)
L = 0 (A.7)
Suppose first that
dσ
dR
< 0. (A.8)
Then, (A.7) and (A.8) imply that
dy
dR
> 0. (A.9)
Next suppose that
dσ
dR
> 0. (A.10)
Differentiating the left-hand side of the inequality in (A.6) with respect to R and using
(A.5), we obtain
−σD′′2
(
y
dσ
dR
+ σ
dy
dR
)
L+
hv
1− v ,
36Alternatively, one can differentiate the LHS of (A.6) taken at the cutoff α(y). This would yield (after
some manipulations)
B
dα
dy
dy
dR
− σD′′2
(
y
dσ
dR
+ σ
dy
dR
)
L+
hv
1− v = 0, where
dα
dy
= − 1
f(y)
< 0,
and so
B
f(y)
dy
dR
= σD′′1
dσ
dR
+
hv
1− v > 0.
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which from (A.7) can be rewritten as
σD′′1
dσ
dR
+
hv
1− v ,
which, from (A.10), is positive. So, once again, we infer that (A.9) holds. Now, if (A.10)
holds, then (A.9) implies that (A.7) can’t hold. Hence (A.8) must hold (i.e., the efficiency
of spending declines), (A.7) and (A.8) imply that d
dR
(yσ) > 0, and hence dg
dR
< 0.
(ii) Behind the veil of ignorance, pork distributed at date 2 and officials’ rents in the two
periods are constant. Date-1 welfare37 is
W = y [B − L[σ +D1(1− σ)]]− g +B0 −D2(g0 − g)
where
y = 1− F
 [σ +D1 (1− σ) + µσ]L−
hv
1− vR
B
 .
W can be written as
W = [B0 − y(L−B)− g0]− φ(y, µ),
where the deadweight loss from manipulations, yL[D1(1−σ)−(1−σ)]+D2(g0−g)−(g0−g),
can be written
φ(y, µ) = yN(µ) +M(µ)
where N and M are increasing functions of µ .
Let us assume that the distributions F and H are uniform. Then
y = y(µ,R) = ξ − β[µσ(µ) + σ(µ) +D1(1− σ(µ))] + γR
for some positive coefficients {α, β, γ}.
And so:
W (µ,R) = B0 − [L−B +N(µ)] [ξ − β[σ +D1(1− σ) + µσ] + γR]− g0 −M(µ).
Note that ∂2W/∂µ∂R < 0, and so the optimal µ decreases with R: accounting manipu-
lations are costlier when pork barrel is high, i.e., when reelection concerns are important;
g therefore increases with R. As for y, and using (A.2)
dy
dR
= γ − β dµ
dR
σ > 0.
37Because (A.2) and (A.3) define y and g as functions of µ, we can optimize W with respect to µ:
µ
[
yL
D′′1
+
1
D′′2
]
=
[L(σ +D1)−B][
1 + h′
(
v
1− v
)2
fR
B
] f σ
B
L,
where f is the density of F .
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Finally,
dG
dR
≡ dg
dR
+ Ly
dσ
dR
+ L
dy
dR
σ > 0.
The cap increases with career concerns for essentially two reasons. First, it needs to
accommodate the increase in pork (dy/dR > 0). Second, because this increase makes
manipulations more costly, the budget constraint must be relaxed and so g and σ increase.

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